ggp

Plethon treats of God in the first three substantive paragraphs of De Differentiis. His first claim is that “…Plato’s view is that God, the supreme sovereign, is the creator of every kind of intelligible and separate substance, and hence of our entire universe. Aristotle, on the other hand, never calls God the creator of anything …

ggp

Plethon treats of God in the first three substantive paragraphs of De Differentiis. His first claim is that “…Plato’s view is that God, the supreme sovereign, is the creator of every kind of intelligible and separate substance, and hence of our entire universe. Aristotle, on the other hand, never calls God the creator of anything …

ggp

Plethon treats of God in the first three substantive paragraphs of De Differentiis. His first claim is that “…Plato’s view is that God, the supreme sovereign, is the creator of every kind of intelligible and separate substance, and hence of our entire universe. Aristotle, on the other hand, never calls God the creator of anything …

ggp

Plethon treats of God in the first three substantive paragraphs of De Differentiis. His first claim is that “…Plato’s view is that God, the supreme sovereign, is the creator of every kind of intelligible and separate substance, and hence of our entire universe. Aristotle, on the other hand, never calls God the creator of anything …

ggp

Plethon treats of God in the first three substantive paragraphs of De Differentiis. His first claim is that “…Plato’s view is that God, the supreme sovereign, is the creator of every kind of intelligible and separate substance, and hence of our entire universe. Aristotle, on the other hand, never calls God the creator of anything …

ggp

Plethon treats of God in the first three substantive paragraphs of De Differentiis. His first claim is that “…Plato’s view is that God, the supreme sovereign, is the creator of every kind of intelligible and separate substance, and hence of our entire universe. Aristotle, on the other hand, never calls God the creator of anything …

http—apps.facebook.com-topeight–network=1&ref=sidenav

http—apps.facebook.com-topeight–network=1&ref=sidenav tags: no_tag Posted from Diigo. The rest of my favorite links are here. 105 413 414 Così Husserl: “Il concetto di 415 M. H 416 Ivi, p. 71. giudizio si riempie nell’intuizione interna di un giudizio attuale; ma in esso non si riempie il concetto dello «è». Così come l’essere non è un elemento …

http—apps.facebook.com-topeight–network=1&ref=sidenav

http—apps.facebook.com-topeight–network=1&ref=sidenav tags: no_tag Posted from Diigo. The rest of my favorite links are here. 105 413 414 Così Husserl: “Il concetto di 415 M. H 416 Ivi, p. 71. giudizio si riempie nell’intuizione interna di un giudizio attuale; ma in esso non si riempie il concetto dello «è». Così come l’essere non è un elemento …